Environmental regulation and competitiveness: Evidence from Romania by Caporale, GM et al.
Department of  
Economics and Finance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Working Paper No. 10-13 
 http://www.brunel.ac.uk/about/acad/sss/depts/economics
 
Ec
on
om
ic
s 
an
d 
Fi
na
nc
e 
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
 S
er
ie
s 
Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Christophe Rault, Robert 
Sova and Anamaria Sova 
 
Environmental Regulation and 
Competitiveness: Evidence from Romania 
 
July 2010 
1 
 
Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness:  
Evidence from Romania 
 
Guglielmo Maria Caporale 
Brunel University (London), CESifo and DIW Berlin1 
Christophe Rault 
LEO (Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orléans), CESifo, IZA, and WDI2 
 
Robert Sova 
CES, Sorbonne University, A.S.E. and E.B.R.C3 
 
Anamaria Sova 
CES, Sorbonne University, and E.B.R.C4 
 
 
Abstract 
According to the pollution haven hypotheses differences in environmental regulation affect trade 
flows and plant location. Specifically, environmental stringency should decrease exports and 
increase imports of “dirty” goods. This paper estimates a gravity model to establish whether the 
implementation of more stringent regulations in Romania has indeed affected its competitiveness 
and decreased exports towards its European trading partners. Our findings do not provide 
empirical support to the pollution haven hypothesis, i.e. environmental stringency is not found to 
affect significantly total trade, or its components (pollution intensive trade and pollution 
intensive trade related to non-resource-based trade). 
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1. Introduction 
The transition process in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has brought 
about significant changes in their economic structure. It has also been associated with growing 
environmental awareness: rising pollution levels due to the development of heavy industries have 
increased the interest in cost-effective regulation. Romania in particular has embarked on a 
radical course of environmental reform, and the accession into the European Union has created a 
new policy focus for appropriate action.   
An important topic in this context is the relationship between environment and 
international trade, which has recently been analysed in various empirical studies investigating 
the effects of environmental regulation on trade flows and export competitiveness. The issue is 
whether more stringent regulations might increase production costs and make pollution-intensive 
industries less competitive in international markets, thereby affecting the development strategies 
of the countries concerned. Further, according to the so-called “pollution haven” hypothesis, 
differences between countries in terms of environmental standards lead to a reallocation of 
polluting industries from those with strict environmental regulations to those with less strict 
policies.  Thus, countries with weak environmental policies (generally with low income) become 
a pollution haven for those with environmental stringency, exporting the “dirty” goods and 
importing the “clean” ones. In contrast, the developed (high income) countries improve the 
quality of their environment by developing a comparative advantage in the clean goods. Typical 
empirical issues encountered in this type of analysis are limited data availability, measuring 
environmental stringency and the endogeneity of this variable. 
The present study focuses on the effect of environment regulation on trade flows (exports 
and imports) in the case of Romania, using a gravity equation. It examines empirically whether 
more stringent domestic environmental policies reduce international competitiveness (more 
specifically, exports of the pollution-intensive products), and their general impact on trade 
patterns. The layout of paper is as follows. Section 2 and 3 provide a brief review of the existing 
empirical and theoretical literature respectively. Section 4 describes the econometric framework 
used for the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
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2.  Empirical studies 
The empirical evidence on the environment-trade nexus is mixed. The most common 
finding is that strict environmental regulations do not affect trade flows and international 
competitiveness (Tobey, 1990; Harris and al., 2002). Only a few studies conclude that they lead 
to a loss of competiveness for pollution-intensive goods (Van Beers and van den Bergh, 1997). 
However, even if more stringent regulations initially mean lower competitiveness and smaller 
market shares reflecting higher production costs, they might also stimulate innovation, improve 
productivity and increase exports in the long run (this is the so-called Porter hypothesis – see 
Porter and van der Linde, 1995). 
Tobey (1990) used a cross-section Heekscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model of international 
trade and found that the introduction of stringent environmental measures had not caused trade 
patterns to deviate from the HOV predictions. Van Beers and van den Bergh (1997) estimated an 
equation for bilateral trade flows introducing two variables for environmental stringency (a broad 
one and a narrow one based on the energy intensity) in a gravity model.   The results, using a 
sample of 21 OECD countries, indicate that the impact of stricter regulations on export and 
import flows is negative.  Van Beers and van den Bergh (2000) revisited the analysis of Tobey 
(1990) using more disaggregated data and partly confirmed his results. Xu (2000) also estimated 
a gravity model, finding evidence that new trade barriers emerge to offset the effects of more 
stringent environmental regulations, and that the trade pattern of environmentally sensitive goods 
remain unchanged. Harris et al. (2002) used a triple indexed fixed effects model (import, export 
and time effects), and showed that, once these effects are taken into consideration, the impact of 
environmental stringency on international trade becomes statistically insignificant.  
Jug and Mirza (2005) proposed an alternative explanation for the low and insignificant 
effect of strict environmental policies on trade flows which is not related to environmental 
features but rather to the degree of product differentiation. They showed that stringency matters 
less in the case of trade in highly differentiated products due to their lower price elasticity. 
Ederington and Minier (2003) investigated the hypothesis that environmental policy has 
been used as a secondary trade barrier, and estimated the impact of environmental regulation on 
trade flows when environmental policy is modelled endogenously, finding that its estimated 
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effect on trade flows is significantly higher than reported in previous studies affected by 
endogeneity bias. 
Levinson and Taylor (2008) showed how unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity and 
aggregation issues generate biases when estimating the relationship between regulatory costs and 
trade. They used data on US regulations and net trade flows between the US, Canada and Mexico 
for 130 manufacturing industries from 1977 to 1986, and reported that the estimated effects of 
pollution costs on net imports are positive and statistically significant. Also, the 2SLS estimates 
are larger than the fixed-effects ones.  
 
3. Theory 
        In the theoretical literature there are two major hypotheses linking the environment and 
trade flows, more precisely the pollution haven and the factor endowments ones. The former 
predicts that countries where environmental policy (regulation) is relatively weak will tend to 
specialise in pollution intensive (or “dirty”) industries. Generally, countries with lax 
environmental regulations are low-income countries. By contrast, the latter predicts that 
differences in factor endowments determine trade patterns and environmental policy has only a 
minor effect. Thus, this hypothesis suggests that countries with abundant capital will specialise 
in and export capital intensive goods, and countries with abundant labour will export labour 
intensive good, regardless of environmental regulations5 . 
Let us consider the haven pollution theory using a model with production –generated pollution.  
The model assumes that there are two goods, X and Y, where X is the dirty good (which 
generates pollution during the production) and Y is the clean good (which does not pollute). 
The production function for good Y using the two factors capital and labour takes the following 
form:  
                                                           Y= F(K, L)                                                                (1) 
                                                            
5  In this paper we will only focus on the haven hypothesis and will not test empirically the factor endowment 
hypothesis. 
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and for good X: 
                                                           X = (1-θ)G(K, L)                                                       (2) 
where: θ represents the abatement effort and lies in the interval between 0 and 1 (0< θ<1): if θ 
=0, there is no abatement effort and pollution rises with the output of the dirty good (X); if θ 
rises, this leads to an increase in the abatement effort and a decrease in the production of X and 
implicitly pollution.   
If it is assumed that X produces emissions and these are generated in the production process, 
then total emissions are given by E=eX, where e represents emission intensity. The model also 
assumes that there are two countries, one rich (A - high income) and the other poor (B - low 
income). A simple supply and demand analysis is used to determine the price under autarchy in 
the two countries. 
The pollution haven model assumes that trading countries are identical with the exception of the 
differences in emission intensity. Therefore their supply curves will also differ, being a function 
of the price (p), emission intensity (e), capital/labour (K/L) and taking the following form: 
                                                 
)/,,(
)/,,()/,,(
LKepY
LKepXLKepRS =                                                 (3) 
When the price and emission intensity increase, the supply of good X relative to good Y 
increases. 
In contrast, the demand curve is the same for the two countries because preferences over goods 
are supposed to be homothetic. Specifically, the demand curve for good X relative to good Y is a 
function of the prices in the two countries: 
                                                       
)(
)(
)(/ pb
pbpRD
y
x
YX =                                                     (4) 
If countries are identical, their supply curve (RS) is the same and so are prices, implying that 
there is no trade. If emission intensity differs and is higher in the low-income country, then weak 
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environmental regulation will lead to more production of the dirty good in this country (B) and to 
a decline in the production of the clean good due to the reallocation of resources from Y to X.  
The pollution haven hypothesis can be illustrated as in the figure below: 
 
Source: Copeland and Taylor (2003) 
The price of the dirty good (X) in the developed country is higher then in the developing country 
(PA >PA*)6 due to the fact that in the former pollution taxes are higher, and therefore the price of 
X under autarchy is higher. Consequently, the production of X declines in the developed country 
but increases in the developing country. Thus, the relative supply of the country with weak 
environmental regulations will shift out to the right (RS*). Hence, the high income country will 
produce and export more of the clean good Y and will import the dirty good X from the low 
income country, whilst the low income country will export X. The pollution level will increase in 
                                                            
6 We use the asterisk for the developing country variables. 
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the developing countries with weak pollution policy and will decrease in the developed countries 
with stringent pollution policy, and the former will provide pollution havens for dirty industries. 
The differences in pollution policy could lead to the migration of the pollution intensive 
industries from developed to developing economies in the presence of less stringent 
environmental regulations, low wages and resource abundance in the latter. Then, an increase in 
the stringency of environmental regulations will imply a loss of competitiveness for dirty 
industries and lower exports of dirty goods. Clearly, if the effects of changes in pollution 
regulations (pollution abatement costs) are modest, then it becomes difficult to maintain the 
pollution haven hypothesis. 
 
4. The econometric framework 
The gravity model is extensively used in the empirical literature on international trade. 
The first studies estimating it were those of Linnemann (1966) and Tinbergen (1962). Its 
theoretical foundations were developed later by Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985) and 
Helpman and Krugman (1985).  This model is also used to test the link between the 
environmental stringency and trade flows (Van Beers and Van den Bergh, 1997, Harris et al. 
2002; Jug and Mirza, 2005). The standard equation takes the following form:  
                ijtijtijt uXST +++= βββ '10                                         (5) 
where Tijt represents trade flows between trading partners (i and j), Sijt is a measure of  
environmental stringency, X1 stands for other variables which differ across countries, β0 is the 
constant and uijt is the error term which captures the measurement errors and is assumed to be 
independently  identically distributed. 
To examine the impact of environmental regulations on trade flows (export and imports), 
we follow Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), whose model takes into account multilateral trade 
resistance (MTR) unlike the "classic version" of the gravity model. As they argue, it is essential 
to analyse not only bilateral resistance to trade (trade barriers between two countries i and j) but 
also multilateral resistance, i.e. trade barriers between each country i or j and all its partners. 
Intuitively, a country has more incentives to trade with a partner when its trade resistance with 
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all other partners is higher. This results in price differences between countries, ignoring which 
may bias the estimates of all the other variables in the gravity equation. 
 
4.1 The Anderson and van Wincoop model 
The Anderson and van Wincoop model (2003) is based on assumptions such as constant 
elasticity of substitution, differentiation of goods by origin and country specialisation in their 
variety. Exports costs (transport costs, information costs, differences in legislation, etc.) are 
borne by the importer and are symmetrical. The model introduces multilateral resistance to trade 
in addition to the bilateral one. The former represents the average cost of imports whatever their 
origin, while the latter concerns import costs between a pair of countries. The modified gravity 
equation has the following form: 
                         ( ) σ−×= 1ji ijwjt PPTYYYijX                          (6) 
where Xij represents exports of country i towards country  j ; Yt, Yj  stand for income of country i 
and j respectively and ∑
=
=
K
k
k
w YY
1
is total income; Tij represents bilateral  resistance  (import 
costs between country i and j); Pi, Pj   are the price index  of country  i and  j respectively and 
represent multilateral resistance for the two countries ; σ is the demand elasticity which is 
assumed to be greater than unity. 
Bilateral trade resistance (Tij) is a vector of observable variables affecting bilateral trade 
costs between country i and country j such as geographical distance (Dij), common border 
(FRTij), common language (LANGij), existence of colonial relations (RLij) and membership of 
trade agreements (ACRij).  
[ ]ijijijij ACRLANGFRTRLijij eDT 43321)( δδδδδ +++=            (7) 
Bilateral resistence (Tij) represents the price of the foreign variety relative to the local 
variety and it is assumed to be symmetric (Tij =Tji). The price indices for consumption (Pi, Pj) for 
country i and j are defined as follows: 
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where wijijji Y
Y )(
)(
1
)( ==− θβ σ  is the share of country j (i) in total income. Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) interpret Pi and Pj as multilateral trade resistance since each is a function of all 
bilateral resistance variables (e.g., Pi for country I is the average of Tij) 
Thus, the gravity equation used to control for the effects of multilateral resistance takes the 
following form: 
ijttijijijijjtitijt uETNaBRDaDISTaGDPaGDPaaX ελ ++++++++= 543210 )log()log()log()log(     (9) 
where : 
• Xijt = exports from country i towards country j, in year t ; millions of dollars, (database : 
COMTRADE) ; 
• GDPit (jt) = Gross domestic product of countries i and j,  in year t,  at purchasing power parity  
(PPP); millions of dollars, (database : Chelem-CEPII) ;   
• DISTij = geographical distance between the  capitals of country  i  and country j respectively; 
kilometers, (Chelem-CEPII) ; 
• BRDij = dummy variable for common border ; FRT = 1 if i and j  have  a common border and 
0 otherwise ; 
• ETNij = dummy variable for the existence of a common minority group; ETNij = 1 if the two 
countries  i and j  have a common minority group and 0 otherwise ;  
• uij =   couple fixed effects for controlling multilateral resistance; 
• λt =  time fixed effects; 
• εijt : error term  
 
The expected signs for the coefficients of the variables included in the model are based on 
theory. For instance, we expect a positive effect on trade flows of variables such as the size of a 
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country, common border and common minority group and a negative impact of geographic 
distance (which is a proxy for transport costs, tariffs, non-tariff barriers and informal barriers). 
Supply of exports and demand for imports are a positive function of the income level in the 
partner countries. As for the coefficient of environmental stringency for exporter and importer, 
STi and SCj are expected to have a negative and positive effect respectively on the basis of the 
pollution haven hypothesis.   
 
4.2 Data  
Our panel spans over a period of 9 years (1999-2007) and includes 20 countries, namely 
Germany, Austria, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Finland, 
Sweden, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Cyprus.  
As data for environmental stringency are not generally available, proxies are normally 
used in empirical studies, for instance an index based on energy intensity (Harris et al., 2002), an 
index developed by the World Bank (Xu, 2000), PACE as a fraction of value added  (Levinson 
and Taylor, 2008) or an index developed by Eurostat ( Jug and Mirza, 2005). We use data from 
Eurostat which provides environmental data for the European Union countries (EU-27). Total 
current expenditure, which represents expenditure for environmental protection activities, is the 
chosen proxy for environmental stringency and a measure of abatement costs. We exclude from 
our sample some countries such as France, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic 
and Greece due to data constraints. Data on bilateral trade (exports and imports) are extracted 
from the COMTRADE database at total level and by sectors.  The GDP data are obtained from 
the IMF, while distance, common border come from CEPII database.  
We consider the following pollution intensive sectors (“dirty” sectors): (251) pulp and 
waste paper, (334) petroleum products, (335) residual petroleum products, (51) organic 
chemicals, (52) inorganic  chemicals, (562) fertilizers, (59) chemical materials, (634) veneers, 
plywood, (635) wood manufactures; (64) paper paperboard, (68) non-ferrous metals;  (661) lime, 
cement, construction materials, (67) iron and steel, (69) metal manufactures (we use the 
classification of dirty industries of Low, 1992). For the pollution intensive trade related to non-
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resource-based trade (footloose sectors) we include the following sectors:  (59) chemical 
materials, (661) lime, cement, construction materials and (69) metals manufactures. 
An important econometric issue is the potential endogeneity of the environmental 
stringency variable. Some studies try to deal with it by using the 2SLS method (Ederington and 
Minier, 2003, Levinson and Taylor, 2008) or a three –way fixed effect model which allows for  
exporter, importer and time specific effects (Harris and al. 2002). In the present study, we shall 
use instead the fixed effect vector decomposition method (FEVD) proposed by Plümper and 
Tröeger (2004). This estimator controls for the potential endogeneity of all right-hand-side 
variables, including environmental stringency, thereby removing this possible bias source, and 
also yields more efficient estimates. Also, the presence of fixed effects allows to take into 
account multilateral resistance. Further, it has desirable finite-sample properties. 
 
5. Empirical results 
  In order to analyse the impact of environmental stringency on the trade flows we estimate 
models for total trade flows (exports and imports) as well as trade of the pollution intensive 
sectors only; we also distinguish between pollution intensive sectors and non-resource-based 
sectors (footloose). The results for total trade (exports and imports) are reported in Table 1. 
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Table 1:  Estimation results of the impact of environmental stringency on total trade 
Note: FEVD stands for the Fixed Effects Decomposition method. 
As can be seen, the estimated coefficients are almost always significant and have the 
expected theoretical signs. The size variable of the exporting country and the partner country 
appear to be two of the main determinants of trade flows between Romania and the EU-27.  The 
proxy for environmental stringency in the exporter country has a positive impact on trade flows 
in all cases, implying that the hypothesis that stricter environmental regulation decreases exports 
and affects competiveness can be rejected. Besides, this variable becomes insignificant when 
exports of Romania towards its trading partners in the EU-27 are considered. Presumably there 
are more important factors affecting trade, such as low wages, regardless of environmental 
regulations. Environmental costs appear to play a marginal role and do not affect trade flows 
 
Variables 
Total trade 
(FEVD) 
Export 
(FEVD) 
Import 
(FEVD) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt
GDPit 1.216 1.056 0.751 0.621 2.297 1.900 
(62.09)*** (10.02)*** (1.93)* (2.31)** (67.47)*** (9.43)*** 
GDPjt 2.739 2.746 1.961 1.803 1.837 2.119 
(84.13)*** (25.41)*** (23.87)*** (20.14)*** (14.62)*** (12.05)*** 
DISTij -1.048 -1.098 -1.620 -1.508 -1.265 -1.605 
(39.57)*** (36.06)*** (54.05)*** (31.04)*** (28.36)*** (25.78)*** 
BRDij 0.072 0.107 0.242 0.216 0.206 0.134 
(2.31)** (17.84)*** (34.92)*** (39.91)*** (5.59)*** (11.76)*** 
ETNit 0.237 0.219 0.046 0.032 0.386 0.322 
(8.12)*** (42.39)*** (51.88)*** (49.20)*** (11.57)*** (44.16)*** 
STit - 0.239 - 0.021 - 0.344 
- (18.05)*** - (0.46) - (30.43)*** 
STjt - 0.059 - 0.083 - -0.140 
- (4.45)*** - (9.03)*** - (0.96) 
λt yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Residuals 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(49.90)*** (29.99)*** (63.15)*** (60.14)*** (29.18)*** (54.78)*** 
Constant -0.302 -0.409 7.167 6.807 0.037 -1.674 
(2.01)** (42.06)*** (89.45)*** (69.83)*** (0.10) (24.13)*** 
Observations 342 342 171 171 171 171 
R-squared 0.81 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.92 0.98 
t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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significantly. Environmental stringency in the importer country has a positive and significant 
effect on trade flows and exports, but a negative and insignificant one on imports.  As for the 
other variables, their estimated effects are consistent with the predictions of the gravity model. 
Geographical distance has a negative impact on trade volume, whilst common border or common 
minority group have a positive one.   
Next, we focus our attention on the impact of environmental stringency on the pollution 
intensive sectors.  Following the classification of the “dirty” industries of Low (1992) we 
consider the 14 “dirty” sectors. Both the sample and the econometric methods used are the same 
as before. The results are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2:  Estimation results of the impact of environmental stringency on the “dirty” trade 
 
Variables 
Total trade 
(FEVD) 
Export 
(FEVD) 
Import 
(FEVD) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt
GDPit 1.217 1.257 1.665 1.846 0.580 0.546 
(48.88)*** (49.33)*** (12.23)*** (11.42)*** (21.83)*** (20.13)***
GDPjt 0.798 0.832 0.269 0.281 1.294 1.287 
(34.69)*** (35.94)*** (11.73)*** (11.77)*** (9.03)*** (7.17)*** 
DISTij -1.491 -1.286 -0.445 -0.399 -1.126 -1.077 
(25.34)*** (23.91)*** (5.55)*** (4.46)*** (13.29)*** (11.38)***
BRDij 0.321 0.254 0.308 0.297 0.402 0.368 
(17.13)*** (17.53)*** (8.58)*** (7.69)*** (8.43)*** (8.16)*** 
ETNij 0.005 0.017 0.228 0.211 0.246 0.269 
(0.16) (0.49) (4.95)*** (4.37)*** (5.38)*** (5.12)*** 
STit - 0.115 - 0.284 - 0.076 
- (2.53)*** - (2.16)** - (0.24) 
STjt - 0.037 - 0.112 - -0.053 
- (0.78) - (1.80)* - (0.34) 
λt yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Residuals 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(110.84)*** (106.62)*** (75.31)*** (74.92)*** (68.92)*** (68.71)***
Constant 0.558 0.441 -2.246 -2.964 -0.589 -0.650 
(3.25)*** (2.48)** (5.75)*** (6.41)*** (1.43) (1.34) 
Observations 4788 4788 2394 2394 2394 2394 
R-squared 0.74 0.79 0.73 0.80 0.79 0.84 
t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: FEVD stands for the Fixed Effects Decomposition method. 
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As before, size, common border and common minority group have a positive effect, 
whilst geographical distance has a negative one. Concerning the impact of environmental 
stringency, it is estimated to be positive in the case of the exporting countries, perhaps because 
these have a comparative advantage for dirty exports such that stricter environmental policies do 
not affect their competitiveness. The sign is the same for importing countries. No statistically 
significant effect on “dirty” imports is found.  
 Finally, we estimated the model for “dirty” and footloose sectors separately. From the 
former we selected those with a sizeable weight in total trade, namely for exports iron and steel 
(67), petroleum products (334) and non-ferrous metals (68), and for imports metals manufactures 
(69), sectors iron and steel (67) and paper paperboard (64). The footloose sectors are chemical 
materials, lime, cement, construction materials and metals manufactures. These sectors are 
supposed to respond significantly to changes in the stringency of environmental regulations. 
The results are shown in Table 3 and 4 respectively. In the case of “dirty” trade, environmental 
regulations in exporting and importing countries have a positive and significant effect on exports 
of each sector but no effect on imports. As for the footloose sectors, the coefficients are not 
statistically significant, indicating that environmental costs do not have an impact on such trade 
flows between Romania and its European partners. 
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Table 3: Estimation results of the impact of environmental stringency on “dirty” exports 
and imports 
Sectors 
 
Variables 
Export 
(FEVD) 
Import 
(FEVD) 
67 334 68 69 67 64 
xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt 
GDPit 1.079 1.210 0.819 0.964 2.028 1.091 
 (2.54)*** (4.30)*** (9.17)*** (10.42)*** (13.29)*** (4.70)*** 
GDPjt 1.186 1.343 1.105 1.172 1.039 1.633 
 (10.21)*** (9.31)*** (10.16)*** (11.75)*** (1.87)* (3.11)*** 
STit 1.292 1.159 0.885 -0.045 0.019 -0.077 
 (2.54)** (3.17)*** (2.65)*** (0.36) (0.11) (0.44) 
STjt 0.185 0.314 0.278 0.381 -0.116 0.402 
 (0.75) (2.20)** (1.13) (1.00) (0.21) (0.76) 
DISTij -1.907 -1.232 -1.455 -0.302 -1.264 -1.373 
 (12.70)*** (5.36)*** (5.79)*** (1.81)* (11.74)*** (4.34)*** 
BRDij 0.149 0.207 0.126 0.573 0.621 0.478 
 (12.45)*** (4.37)*** (3.87)*** (5.65)*** (7.10)*** (6.80)*** 
ETNij 0.169 0.153 0.117 0.051 0.208 0.194 
 (2.81)*** (3.49)*** (3.13)*** (0.42) (1.96)* (1.15) 
Residuals 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (17.61)*** (10.85)*** (14.84)*** (32.79)*** (21.33)*** (22.17)*** 
Constant 2.550 -2.064 -1.518 -2.399 4.185 -0.055 
 (3.44)*** (0.98) (0.70) (8.03)*** (2.94)*** (0.03) 
Observations 171 171 171 171 171 171 
R-squared 0.73 0.62 0.69 0.91 0.78 0.80 
t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: FEVD stands for the Fixed Effects Decomposition method. 
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Table 4: Estimation results of the environmental stringency impact on the export and 
import  non resources based sectors 
 
Variables 
Total trade 
(FEVD) 
Export 
(FEVD) 
Import 
(FEVD) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt 
GDPit 0.768 0.821 1.439 1.307 1.973 2.053 
(18.12)*** (19.69)*** (5.93)*** (4.76)*** (21.13)*** (19.04)*** 
GDPjt 1.982 2.020 0.415 0.477 1.501 1.474 
(40.30)*** (39.58)*** (9.25)*** (7.33)*** (6.40)*** (5.93)*** 
DISTij -1.781 -1.629 -0.791 -0.612 -2.383 -2.131 
(17.21)*** (16.33)*** (5.25)*** (5.82)*** (16.49)*** (15.91)*** 
BRDij 0.235 0.219 0.194 0.163 1.172 1.695 
(11.95)*** (12.05)*** (5.30)*** (5.65)*** (10.87)*** (10.93)*** 
ETNij 0.049 0.038 0.203 0.221 0.123 -0.115 
(0.83) (0.63) (2.31)** (2.76)** (1.56) (1.04) 
STit - 0.287  0.510  -0.048 
- (3.52)***  (0.83)  (0.58) 
STjt - -0.113  0.057  -0.037 
- (1.35)  (0.60)  (0.15) 
λt yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Residuals 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(68.88)*** (65.97)*** (41.96)*** (40.82)*** (49.38)*** (48.86)*** 
Constant -0.035 -0.195 -1.104 -1.576 -0.018 0.182 
(0.12) (0.61) (1.49) (1.85)* (0.03) (0.24) 
Observations 1026 1026 513 513 513 513 
R-squared 0.80 0.83 0.71 0.75 0.82 0.87 
t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: FEVD stands for the Fixed Effects Decomposition method. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to analyse the relationship between environmental regulation and 
trade flows, more precisely whether the implementation of more stringent regulations has 
affected international competitiveness and decreased the exports of Romania towards its trading 
partners in the EU-27. We estimated gravity models to investigate separately the effects of 
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environmental stringency on total trade (exports and imports), on pollution intensive trade and on 
pollution intensive trade related to non-resource-based trade.  
In most cases the environmental stringency variable in exporting countries is found to have a 
positive and significant effect, in contrast with the haven hypothesis which implies that stricter 
environmental regulation decreases exports and increases imports. However, there is no evidence 
of such an effect in the case of “dirty” trade, possibly because of a comparative advantage such 
that stricter environmental policies do not affect competitiveness significantly. Other factors, 
such a labour costs, presumably play a much more important role, environmental costs 
representing a very small percentage of total production costs.  
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